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Migration and the Wage Curve: A Structural Approach to 
Measure the Wage and Employment Effects of Migration
*
 
Based on a wage curve approach we examine the labor market effects of migration in 
Germany. The wage curve relies on the assumption that wages respond to a change in the 
unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. This allows one to derive the wage and employment 
effects of migration simultaneously in a general equilibrium framework. For the empirical 
analysis we employ the IABS, a two percent sample of the German labor force. We find that 
the elasticity of the wage curve is particularly high for young workers and workers with a 
university degree, while it is low for older workers and workers with a vocational degree. The 
wage and employment effects of migration are moderate: a 1 percent increase in the German 
labor force through immigration increases the aggregate unemployment rate by less than 0.1 
percentage points and reduces average wages by less 0.1 percent. While native workers 
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High and increasing immigration rates in the US and Europe have fanned
fears that migrants reduce wages and harm employment opportunities of
the native labor force. Concerns that immigration increases unemployment
are particularly widespread in the continental European countries, where
unemployment is high and persisting. In this paper we apply an aggregate
wage curve approach to analyze the labor market e®ects of immigration.
The wage curve relies on the assumption that wages respond to changes
in the unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. This allows us to consider
institutional and other labor market rigidities, which are particularly relevant
in the European context. In contrast to the overwhelming majority of the
empirical literature, which addresses the impact of migration on wages and
(un-)employment separately, we analyze the wage and employment e®ects of
migration simultaneously in a general equilibrium framework.
Following the seminal contributions of Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and
Peri (2006), we employ a nested production function which assumes that
migrant and native workers within the same experience and education group
are imperfect substitutes. We also consider the imperfect adjustment of
capital stocks. Since it is likely that the bargaining power of workers and
employers varies in the di®erent segments of the labor market, we allow the
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Figure 1: Net migration rate per thousand, 1960-2005
2We apply this framework empirically to Germany, which is the third
most popular destination for migrants in the world after the US and Rus-
sia (Freeman, 2006). With the fall of the Berlin wall, the net immigration
rate climbed in Western Germany from about zero at the beginning of the
1980s to about 6 per thousand at the beginning of the 1990s, compared to
3 per thousand in the ¯fteen member states of the then European Union
(EU-15) and 4 per thousand in the US (World Bank, 2007). Three main
groups have contributed to this immigration surge: foreigners from Central
and Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia, ethnic Germans (so-called
"SpÄ ataussiedler"), and East Germans. However, since the beginning of this
millennium, the net immigration rate has dropped to less than 3 per thousand
in the course of Germany's economic downturn (Figure 1).
Our empirical analysis is based on a 2 percent sample of the German
labor force (IABS) which is derived from social security records. The IABS
provides detailed information on education and experience of employed and
unemployed individuals in the labor force. This data set allows us to identify
the elasticities of the wage curve for education and experience groups and
to estimate the elasticities of substitution between di®erent types of labor in
Western Germany in the period from 1980 to 2004.
We ¯nd an average elasticity of the wage curve of -0.12 at the national
level, which is slightly higher than the elasticities found in regional level
studies in other OECD countries (see Blanch°ower and Oswald, 1994a; Card,
1995; Nijkamp and Poot, 2005), but substantially higher than that found at
the regional level in Germany. However, the elasticities of the wage curves
°uctuate considerably across skill groups and experience groups. Labor mar-
ket °exibility is particularly high for highly educated workers and workers
with little work experience.
At the given skill structure of the foreign workforce, a 1 percent increase
in labor supply through the immigration of foreigners increases the unem-
ployment rate by less than 0.1 percentage points in the short run, while
it remains stable in the long run. Average wages decline by less than 0.1
percent. While native workers tend to bene¯t from higher wages and lower
unemployment risks, wages of the foreign labor force decline by about 0.5
percent and the unemployment rate increases by about 0.3 percentage points
in the short run and by 0.1 percentage points in the long run. Interestingly
enough, for the labor supply shock during the period 1980-2004, we ¯nd that
immigration reduces unemployment in the short run. This can be traced back
to the fact that wages do not completely adjust to labor demand changes.
The employment gains in a segment with relatively low wage °exibility can
therefore more than compensate for losses in labor market segments with
higher wage °exibility. However, this e®ect disappears in our simulations
3when wages have adjusted to their long-run levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
empirical literature on the wage and employment e®ects of immigration. Sec-
tion 3 outlines the model. Section 4 describes the dataset. Section 5 presents
the identi¯cation strategy and the estimation results for the elasticities of
the wage curves, the capital stock adjustment, and the elasticities of the pro-
duction function. Section 6 simulates the employment and wage impact of
immigration on the German labor market. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
Despite a large number of careful studies, the empirical literature has pro-
duced mixed evidence regarding the wage and employment e®ects of migra-
tion. The overwhelming share of this literature uses the variance of foreigner
shares across regions for the identi¯cation of the wage and employment ef-
fects of migration. Although the ¯ndings of this literature vary from study to
study, both the wage and the employment e®ects of migration seem to clus-
ter around zero (see the surveys and meta-studies by Friedberg and Hunt,
1995; Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot, 2005, 2006). This spatial correlation ap-
proach may yield spurious results if migrants are not randomly distributed
across locations. Moreover, the adjustment of other labor or capital °ows
may equilibrate the migration e®ects across regions. This literature there-
fore either relies on natural experiments (e.g. Card, 1990; Carrington and
DeLima, 1996; Hunt, 1992) or uses instrumental variable estimators to cor-
rect for the endogeneity of locational choices of migrants (e.g. DeNew and
Zimmermann, 1994; Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann, 1995; MÄ uhleisen and
Zimmermann, 1994; Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a,b; Pischke and Velling, 1997).
It nevertheless remains controversial whether the wage and employment ef-
fects of migration can be properly identi¯ed by spatial correlations between
migration shares and labor market outcomes.1
The spatial correlation approach has been challenged in an in°uential pa-
per by Borjas (2003) which exploits the variance of the foreigner share across
education and experience groups at the national level to identify the wage
e®ects of migration. Under the assumption that the education and experi-
ence characteristics of the migrant workforce are exogenous, this allows an
unbiased estimation of the labor market e®ects of migration. Borjas (2003)
measures the elasticities between wages and labor supply shocks in the dif-
ferent education and experience cells of the US labor market and ¯nds an
1See Card (2001), Borjas, Freemann, and Katz (1997) and Borjas (2003) for controver-
sial arguments and evidence.
4elasticity of between -0.3 and -0.4, which implies that a 10 percent increase of
the labor force through migration reduces wages by 3 to 4 percent. Aydemir
and Borjas (2007) obtain the same elasticities for Canada and Mexico. Based
on a similar approach Bonin (2005) however ¯nds that an immigration of 10
percent reduces wages by less than 1 percent in Germany.
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) however ¯nd in a national-level framework
results which are comparable to those of the spatial-correlation studies. Em-
ploying the same dataset as Borjas (2003) they ¯nd that immigration has
increased native wages on average in the US, while wages of foreigners tend
to decline substantially. Two aspects set their approach apart from the Bor-
jas (2003) study: ¯rst, they provide evidence that native and foreign workers
within the same education and experience cell of the labor market are im-
perfect substitutes, while Borjas (2003) assumes perfect substitutionality.2
Second, they consider the adjustment of capital stocks, while Borjas (2003)
treats the physical capital stock as ¯xed { in line with the overwhelming
majority of the literature.3 Ottaviano and Peri (2006) ¯nd that a one per-
cent increase of the labor force through immigration increases native wages
by 0.06 percent under the assumption of a ¯xed capital stock and by 0.16
percent under the assumption of complete capital stock adjustment, while
the wages of the foreign-born workforce decline by about 2.1 percent in the
short run and by about 1.8 percent in the long run.
Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) focus on wages and rely
implicitly on the assumption that labor markets clear. The application of
this approach is particularly questionable in the case of economies that are
characterized by wage rigidities and involuntary unemployment. There exists
a large literature which analyzes the e®ects of migration on employment op-
portunities of natives (see Bonin, 2005; Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson, 2006;
Hatizius, 1994; MÄ uhleisen and Zimmermann, 1994; Pischke and Velling, 1997;
Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot, 2006, for a meta-analysis). This literature treats
the wage and employment e®ects of migration separately, however, ignoring
the interactions between wage rigidities and the employment e®ects of mi-
gration.4
This is the aspect in which the present paper contributes to the state of
2Aydemir and Borjas (2007), however, could not replicate these results. They found
that native and foreign workers are perfect substitutes in the US and Canadian labor
markets, con¯rming earlier results by Jaeger (1996) for the US.
3Aydemir and Borjas (2007) relax this assumption by applying a similar approach to
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) for the adjustment of the capital stock.
4The Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2006) paper, which considers the impact of wages
on the decision to participate in labor markets and in criminal activities, may be regarded
as an exception in this context, although it still assumes that wages are perfectly °exible.
5the literature. We address the labor market e®ects of migration in a frame-
work where wages and employment are simultaneously determined. Follow-
ing the wage curve literature (Blanch°ower and Oswald, 1994a, 1995), we
assume that an equilibrium relationship exists between the wage level and
the unemployment rate. This sets the wage curve apart from the Phillips
(1958) curve, which relates the growth rate of wages to the unemployment
rate and considers this relationship as a disequilibrium phenomenon.5
We estimate the wage curve at the national level. This distinguishes our
approach from the traditional wage curve literature, which uses the variance
across regions for the identi¯cation of the wage curve. The macroeconomic
relationship between the wage and the unemployment rate is sometimes la-
beled as a 'wage setting curve' (Blanchard, 2003) or 'aggregate wage curve'
(Blanch°ower and Oswald, 2005). Starting with Sargan (1964), there ex-
ist a number of studies that empirically examine the relation between the
wage and unemployment rate at the national level (see e.g. Guichard and
La®argue, 2000, for a recent contribution). Card (1995) presents empirical
evidence for the US that a wage curve exists at the national level that dis-
plays similar elasticities to those found by Blanch°ower and Oswald (1994a)
at the regional level.
In our view it is appropriate to estimate the wage curve at the national
level if centralized wage setting plays { as in Germany { an important role. In
this case regions do not form independent labor market units. Consequently,
regional level studies may understate the elasticity between wages and un-
employment. Interestingly enough, we ¯nd an elasticity of the wage curve at
the national level which is substantially larger than that found in a recent re-
gional level study for Germany employing a similar data set (Baltagi, Blien,
and Wolf, 2007).
D'Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2008) and Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler
(2008) recently applied the Ottaviano and Peri (2006) approach to the anal-
ysis of the labor market impact of immigration in Germany. Both papers
highlight the importance of wage rigidities for an assessment of the labor
market e®ects of migration. However, the empirical framework of these pa-
pers follows the standard approach of the existing literature in estimating
separate employment equations, while we apply a structural approach that
determines employment and wages simultaneously in a general equilibrium
framework.
5Bentolila, Dolado, and Jimeno (2007) examine the e®ects of immigration in a Phillips
curve framework. This paper addresses the question of whether immigration has changed
the slope of the Phillips curve in Spain, while we assume { based on the existing empirical
evidence { that the slope of the wage curve is rather stable over time.
63 Theoretical background
The model builds on Boeri and BrÄ ucker (2005) and Levine (1999) in deriving
the wage and employment e®ects of migration from a wage curve. While these
papers focus on the aggregate e®ects of migration, we group the labor force
by education, experience, and nationality here. Similar to Borjas (2003) and
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) we follow Card and Lemieux (2001) in employing
a nested CES production function for this purpose.
The wage curve can be based on di®erent theoretical foundations (see
Blanch°ower and Oswald, 1994a; Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, 1991, for
a discussion). In our context, two modeling traditions are particularly im-
portant. First, the wage curve can be derived from bargaining models (see
e.g. Lindbeck, 1993; Layard and Nickell, 1986), which assume that trade
unions are concerned about both their employed and unemployed members.
Consider the case where wages are ¯xed in a bilateral bargaining monopoly
between trade unions and employer federations. Once wages are ¯xed, ¯rms
hire workers until the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate. Both
parties are aware of this. Consequently, the negotiated wage is lower when
unemployment is higher and vice versa.
Second, in a completely non-unionized environment, the wage curve can
be explained by e±ciency-wage considerations (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984),
where the productivity of workers is linked to the wage level. Unemployment
works here as disciplining device since it determines the di±culties in ¯nding
a new job. As a result, ¯rms will reduce the remuneration of workers if the
unemployment rate is increasing since they can achieve the same level of
productivity at a lower wage.
Both approaches have in common that they replace the conventional labor
supply curve with a wage ¯xing function and that they rely on standard
assumptions about labor demand (Blanch°ower and Oswald, 1995; Layard
and Nickell, 1986). However, di®erent conclusions regarding the shape of the
wage curve emerge from these di®erent theoretical foundations: on the one
hand, the bargaining model predicts a °atter wage curve in labor market
segments with a higher share of unionized workers. The share of unionized
workers is exceptionally high among workers with a vocational training degree
in Germany, i.e., among workers with a medium skill level. On the other
hand, the e±ciency wage model expects a °atter wage curve for workers
with a higher level of ¯rm-speci¯c human capital, since ¯rm-speci¯c human
capital drives a wedge between productivity at the current employer and the
outside opportunity wages, thereby allowing employers to "smooth" wages
across the business cycle (Card, 1995). Thus, it is likely that the wage curve
is °atter for high-skilled workers since they tend to acquire greater levels of
7¯rm-speci¯c human capital.
Therefore we do not derive the wage curve from a speci¯c wage bargaining
or e±ciency wage model here. We instead assume that a wage-¯xing mech-
anism exists, which responds to the unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly.
Following Card (1995), we allow the wage curve to vary for di®erent groups
of the labor force. Once wages are ¯xed, pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms hire work-
ers until the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate. This approach
allows us to derive the employment and wage response to an exogenous labor
supply shock in a general equilibrium framework. The elasticities of the pro-
duction function and of the wage curve determine a system of simultaneous
equations that can be solved analytically.
3.1 A structural approach to immigration and unem-
ployment
Suppose that the aggregate output of an economy is produced with di®er-
ent types of labor and physical capital. In general form, we can write the
aggregate production function as
Y = F (L;K); (1)
where Y denotes aggregate output, L a vector of di®erent types of labor
inputs, and K the capital stock. We assume that the production function
F(¢) exhibits constant returns to scale and positive and diminishing marginal
products with respect to each input, and satis¯es the Inada (1963)-conditions.
For the sake of convenience we have skipped time subscripts.
We distinguish labor inputs by education, experience, and nationality.
Wages and the demand for labor are determined sequentially. In the ¯rst
stage, wages are ¯xed. The elasticity of the wage with respect to the un-
employment rate may di®er in each cell of the labor market depending on
the bargaining power of the partners in the wage negotiations or the level
of speci¯c human capital. In the second stage, pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms hire
workers until the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate.
Writing the wage in each cell of the labor market as a function of the
respective unemployment rate gives
wijk = Áijk(uijk); Á
0
ijk < 0; (2)
where wijk is the wage of a worker with education i, experience j and national
origin k, Áijk is a function which captures the response of the wage to the
8unemployment rate. The unemployment rate uijk is de¯ned as




where Lijk and Nijk denote the employed workforce and the labor force of
education i, experience j and national origin k, respectively.
The condition that the wage rate in equation (2) equals the marginal
product of labor allows us to solve for the employment response to a change in
labor supply. Note that the marginal product of labor in a speci¯c education,
experience, and national origin cell of the labor market is a®ected by the
employment changes in all other cells of the labor market. Solving for the
employment response thus requires solving a system of equations for all other
cells of the labor market, which is determined by the wage curves and the
production function. This system has to satisfy in each cell of the labor
market the implicit function
©ijk = wijk(L;K) ¡ Áijk(uijk) = 0; 8 ijk: (3)
Di®erentiating this system implicitly with respect to a marginal migration




























where dM is a scalar which captures the marginal immigration shock to the
economy, Á a vector of functions which determine as above the wage response
to the unemployment rate, and N a vector of the labor force in each cell of
the labor market. We assume here that the capital stock may adjust to a
labor supply shock through migration, i.e., that dK
dM ¸ 0.
Equation (4) has an economic interpretation. Consider two extreme cases:
¯rst, assume that labor markets are completely °exible, which requires that
Á0







i.e., the marginal employment response equals the marginal increase in the
labor force in each cell of the labor market. This case corresponds to the
textbook example of the impact of migration in an economy with clearing
labor markets and an inelastic supply of native labor (e.g. Wong, 1995, pp.
628-632).
9Second, assume that labor markets are completely in°exible, i.e., that
Á0

















which equals zero if the capital stock does not adjust to the labor supply
shock. This case corresponds to the famous Harris and Todaro (1970) model.
In the empirically relevant case, i.e., when 0 > Á0
ijk > ¡1, employment
adjusts partially to a labor supply shock through migration, depending on the
elasticities of the wage curve and the elasticities of substitution as determined
by the production function.
Finally, having solved for the employment response, it is straightforward














3.2 Outline of the empirical framework
For the empirical analysis we have to impose more structure on the economy.
We follow Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) in assuming that the
production function can be approximated by nested CES technologies. The
aggregate workforce is decomposed in i = 1:::4 education groups, j = 1:::8
experience groups, and k = 1;2 nationality groups, which gives together with
physical capital 65 production factors. Although the nested CES function im-
poses some restrictions on the elasticities of substitution, it has the advantage
that it is parsimonious in the parameters. Note that a general speci¯cation
of the production technologies, such as the translog function, would require
estimating 2,016 di®erent parameters of the production function in our case.
Supposing that the aggregate production function in equation (1) can be






where Yt denotes aggregate output, At total factor productivity, Lt the aggre-
gate labor input, Kt physical capital, ® the income share of labor, and t the
time index. Assuming a constant elasticity of substitution across education












µit = 1; (7)
10where Lit is an aggregate measure for the employed workforce with education
i, µit a skill-speci¯c productivity level and ± > 0 a constant parameter which
determines the elasticity of substitution between labor of di®erent education
levels. We assume the productivity parameter µit to vary over time since
skill-biased technological progress might a®ect the productivity of various
types of labor in di®erent ways.












µij = 1; (8)
where Lijt denotes an aggregate measure for employed workers of skill group i
and experience group j, µijt a productivity parameter, and ½ > 0 a parameter
which determines the elasticity of substitution of labor with similar education
but di®erent experience.
Finally, the employment within each education and experience cell is given













µijk = 1; (9)
where Lijkt denotes workers of skill group i, experience group j, and national
origin k, µijk a productivity parameter, and ¾i a parameter which determines
the elasticity of substitution between native and foreign workers.
We allow ¾i to di®er across education groups, assuming that the elasticity
of substitution between native and foreign workers varies across education
groups given that the importance of language, culture, and other factors may
di®er by education.
Our a priori expectation is that workers within each education and experi-
ence group are closer substitutes than those across education and experience
groups, which implies that ¾i > ½, and that workers within the same skill
group are closer substitutes than those across skill groups, which implies that
½ > ±.
Assuming that the wage rate equals the marginal product of labor and
choosing output as the numeraire good, we can derive from the production































where · denotes the capital-output ratio.
The interest rate is a function of the capital-output ratio, i.e., r = 1¡®
· .
Thus, the complete adjustment of the capital stock to an aggregate labor sup-
ply shock requires that the capital-output ratio remains constant. Note that
a constant capital-output ratio is predicted by neoclassical growth models
and one of the stylized facts about economic growth (Kaldor, 1961). Follow-
ing Ottaviano and Peri (2006) we assume that d·
dM · 0, which is examined
below.
The derivatives of equation (10) are used for ¯nding the partial derivatives
of the wage with respect to the labor supply changes in equation (4). For an
explicit solution of the employment response, see the Appendix.
Finally, having solved for the employment response we can express the








































































where sqnmt, sinmt, sijmt, sijt and sit denote the share of the wages paid to
workers in the respective labor market cells in the total wage bill.6 The terms
in brackets include the response of employment to migration as determined by
equation (4) as well as the response of the capital-output ratio to migration.
Note that the assumption that the wage rate equals the marginal product
























12found in the existing literature. Thus we can compare our ¯ndings regarding
the wage e®ects of a marginal employment shock inter alia with those of
Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006).
4 Data
4.1 Description of the dataset
In our empirical analysis we use the IAB Sample (IABS), a two percent
random sample of all German employees registered with the social security
system covering the period 1975-2004. The IABS provides information on
socio-economic and job characteristics at the individual level. Supplemen-
tary information on bene¯t recipients is added to the sample. The IABS is
strati¯ed according to nationality and therefore representative for the native
and foreign working population.
Being of an administrative nature, the IABS provides longitudinal infor-
mation on the employment and unemployment history of employees. Each
employment and unemployment spell contains a starting and an ending date
and provides accurate information on the timing of transitions between un-
employment and employment. Reported wages are used to calculate social
security contributions of the employers and are highly reliable. Hence the
dataset is especially suitable for performing analyses taking wages into ac-
count.
Nevertheless the IABS has also some limitations in the context of our
analysis: the main shortcoming is that we can identify foreigners only on
the basis of citizenship. There is no information on the year when immi-
grants entered the country. This has several implications. First, due to the
jus sanguinis tradition of the German law, naturalization rates have been
traditionally very low, such that second and third generation migrants often
still have foreign citizenship and are therefore recorded as foreign workers in
our sample. On August 1, 1999, a new immigration act came into e®ect that
allows German-born children of foreign-born parents living for at least eight
years in Germany to decide up to the age of 23 which nationality to adopt.
This has substantially increased the naturalization of German-born individ-
uals whose parents have a migrant background. Our dataset may therefore
su®er from a structural break.
To mitigate the possible e®ects of naturalizations, we have classi¯ed all
individuals as foreigners who are reported as foreign citizen in their ¯rst
available spell. This does not allow us to control for individuals who are
naturalized before entering the sample, but avoids naturalizations from being
13displayed in our sample as a declining foreigner share.
Second, ethnic Germans { so-called "SpÄ ataussiedler" { are reported in
the dataset as Germans, since the concept of citizenship does not allow us to
distinguish between home and foreign-born German citizens. However, spe-
cial bene¯ts have been o®ered to ethnic Germans, such as language courses
and other integration subsidies that should facilitate labor market integra-
tion, and these measures are reported in the bene¯t recipient ¯le added to
our dataset. This allows us to identify the overwhelming share of ethnic
Germans who have entered the German labor force since 1980. Since ethnic
Germans' labor market performance and language command resembles that
of other foreigners (see e.g. Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997; Zimmermann,
1999), we have classi¯ed ethnic Germans as members of the foreign labor
force.
Third, Eastern Germany is not covered by the IABS before 1992. We can
therefore only identify migrants from Eastern Germany if they appear the
¯rst time in the dataset after 1992 and if their ¯rst spell indicates that they
reside in Eastern Germany. A large number of East-West migrants moved
to Western Germany before appearing as employed or unemployed in the
dataset, e.g., as students (Burda and Hunt, 2001; Hunt, 2006). Moreover,
a large part of the East-West migrants in Germany cannot be identi¯ed
since more than one-third of the two million migrants from Eastern Germany
moved to Western Germany immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall, i.e.,
before German reuni¯cation in October 1990 (Bundesamt, 2006).
The dataset thus captures only part of this immigration surge. Moreover,
those individuals who can be identi¯ed as East Germans have di®erent ed-
ucation and experience characteristics than those individuals from Eastern
Germany who we cannot identify. We thus classify East Germans here as
natives. Treating East-West migrants as natives is appropriate in our view
since individuals from Eastern Germany share the same language and cul-
tural background with individuals who have grown up in Western Germany.
Not surprisingly, the labor market performance of East-West migrants is
similar or even slightly better than that of West Germans if we control for
education and experience (BrÄ ucker and TrÄ ubswetter, 2007).
There are moreover other features of the dataset that may a®ect our
analysis. First, the employment history of individuals is interrupted if job-
seekers are not eligible for unemployment bene¯ts, unemployment assistance,
or maintenance allowance. This implies that individuals are considered to be
out of the labor force and are therefore not covered in the sample although
they might be looking for a job. From administrative data sources of the
Federal Employment Agency we know that about 90 percent of the registered
unemployed are eligible for bene¯ts. Therefore the unemployment rate is only
14slightly biased downwards (Wagner and Jahn, 2004).
Second, self-employed workers and civil servants do not contribute to
the social security system and are therefore not covered by our sample. To
the best of our knowledge there is no indication that foreign workers are
disproportionally self-employed compared to native workers. In the case of
civil servants, it seems plausible to assume that due to legal restrictions,
immigrants do not substitute natives.
Third, our data are right-censored since gross wages can only be observed
up to the social security contribution ceiling. About three percent of the
employment spells are censored. This may a®ect the estimation of the wage
curves particularly in the high-skilled segments of the labor market. We have
therefore imputed wages above the social security contribution ceiling using
a heteroscedastic single imputation approach speci¯cally developed for the
IABS data set (BÄ uttner and RÄ assler, 2007). The regression is run separately
for each year and according to nationality for Western German employees.
In addition we included the following variables: age, age squared, six educa-
tional groups, industry codes, four variables for the occupational status, and
ten occupational variables, classifying the actual position held by the worker.
Fourth, the dataset reports gross daily wages and does not provide in-
formation on the hours worked. We therefore exclude part-time employees,
marginal employees, trainees, interns and home-workers from the sample
since the wage information is not accurate for these groups. For the same
reason we exclude workers with wages below the social security contribution
threshold although they are coded as full time workers. These workers are
likely to hold a "mini job". Their income is exempted from the social secu-
rity contributions up to threshold which is adjusted on a sporadic basis (400
euros per month in 2007). There is no indication that this creates a source of
bias in the empirical analysis since foreigners are proportionally represented
in the respective groups.
Fifth, we restrict our analysis to full-time employees between the ages of
15 and 60. The reasons are that the statutory retirement age for females is
the age of 60, for males the age of 65. In addition, there is some empirical
evidence of di®erences in early retirement behavior between German and
immigrant men (Bonin, Ra®elhÄ uschen, and Walliser, 2000).
We focus in our analysis on Western Germany, since Eastern Germany
is not included in the IABS before 1992. Note that the foreigner share in
Eastern Germany is almost negligible. German reuni¯cation also requires
excluding Western Berlin, since mobility between Eastern and Western Berlin
has been high since the fall of the wall. Furthermore, local employment o±ces
in Berlin were pooled, which prevents us from clearly distinguishing between
unemployed workers in Western and Eastern Berlin since reuni¯cation.
15Following the model outlined in Section 3, we group the labor force by
education and potential work experience. A sensible classi¯cation following
the characteristics of the German labor market requires us to distinguish
four education groups: no vocational degree, vocational degree, a high school
degree ("Abitur") with a vocational training degree, and a university degree.
The group with a university degree also covers individuals with a degree
from a university of applied sciences ("Fachhochschule"). Furthermore we
distinguish eight potential work experience classes following the standard
approach by Borjas (2003) in subtracting the typical number of years spent in
the educational system from the age of the worker and splitting the experience
in intervals of ¯ve years. At the beginning of the sample period, we have
only a few observations in some education experience classes. Therefore, we
exclude the 1975 - 1979 period and con¯ne our analysis to individuals who
where employed or unemployed on September 30 during the period from 1980
to 2004 (Table 1).
Table 1 about here
The information on education is provided by the employers in the IABS.
This means that information on education levels is missing for about 17 per-
cent of the individuals. Foreigners are disproportionally a®ected by missing
information on education levels. We therefore imputed the missing informa-
tion on education by employing the procedure developed by Fitzenberger,
Osikominu, and VÄ olter (2005) for an earlier version of the IABS. In a ¯rst
step, spells with valid and invalid educational information are identi¯ed by
classifying the reliability of employers' reporting behavior. In subsequent
steps, only valid education information is used for extrapolation. This pro-
cedure also allows us to correct inconsistent education information on in-
dividuals over time. After applying this imputation procedure, we had to
drop only 1.5 percent of the individuals because of missing or inconsistent
information on education.
Education and work experience acquired in foreign countries may not have
the same value in the labor market as education and experience acquired
in Germany. Moreover, certain characteristics of foreigners, such as their
command of the German language, may prevent them from fully transferring
acquired human capital to the German labor market. However, correcting
for the acquired education and experience levels of foreigners by variables
which are related to their labor market performance in Germany involves an
endogeneity problem. It may moreover bias our estimates of the elasticity
16of substitution between native and foreign workers. We therefore employ
the same rules for the classi¯cation of education and experience groups for
foreign and native workers.
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Figure 2: Share of foreign labor force and workers
Figure 2 displays the share of foreigners { including ethnic Germans { in
the labor force and the share of foreigners among the employed workforce.
During the 1980s, we observe a sharp decline, which is a consequence of
tightening migration restrictions after the ¯rst and second oil price shock
in Germany. The sharp increase in the foreigner share during the 1990s
is a result of the fall of the Berlin wall and the civil wars in the former
Yugoslavia, which triggered large migration °ows to Germany. Note that
the ethnic Germans who contributed substantially to the increasing labor
supply in the 1990s are treated here as foreigners. Since the beginning of
the 2000s the foreigner share is stagnating as a consequence of the slowdown
of economic growth and tightening of immigration conditions. Moreover,
17foreigners tend to be more than proportionally a®ected by unemployment,
such that their share in the employed workforce declined relative to their
share in the labor force during the 1990s (Figure 2).
The foreign labor force increased dramatically during the period 1984
to 1993 as a consequence of the fall of the Berlin wall and the transition
in Central and Eastern Europe. We therefore simulate the e®ects of this
particular labor supply shock separately.
Table A1 presents the share of the foreign workforce by education and
experience classes. The foreign workforce is heavily concentrated in the group
of no vocational training. The foreigner share is moreover increasing in this
low-skilled segment of the labor market from 31 percent in 1980 to 48 percent
in 2004. In the other educational groups, the foreigner share varies between
5 percent and 9 percent. In the high-skilled segment of the labor market, the
foreigner share fell from 7.5 percent in 1980 to 5.5 percent in the 1990s and
recovered slightly later, achieving a share of 6.5 percent in the early 2000s.
Altogether, the foreign workforce is more than proportionally represented in
the low-skilled segment of the labor market.
Tables A2 and A3 display the wage levels for natives and foreign workers
by education and experience groups. We report gross wages on a daily basis.
A consistent consumer price index for the observation period is not available.
We therefore employed the GDP de°ator for the de°ation of wages.
Wage levels increase with education levels and with experience in all edu-
cation groups. The wage levels of foreign workers are in all education groups
below those of their counterparts in the native labor force. While these dif-
ferences are fairly small in the education groups of no vocational degree, they




A large empirical literature estimates wage curves using the variance of wages
and unemployment rates across regions and branches (see Blanch°ower and
Oswald, 1994a, 1995; Card, 1995). Based on this approach Baltagi and Blien
(1998) have estimated the elasticity of the wage curve at about -0.07 for
Western Germany, which matches the average elasticity of about -0.08 found
in several OECD countries (see Nijkamp and Poot, 2005). However, in a
recent study for Germany, Baltagi, Blien, and Wolf (2007) estimate the long-
run elasticity between the wage and the unemployment rate at between -0.02
18and -0.03 employing a dynamic ¯xed e®ects model.
Based on the model outlined in Section 3, we deviate here from the
standard approach by using the variance of wages and unemployment rates
over time and across education and experience groups for the identi¯cation
of the wage curve instead of the variance across regions. Note that our
dataset contains 25 time-series observations that can be used for identi¯ca-
tion. Moreover, we specify the model in dynamic form following Blanchard
and Katz (1997), Blanch°ower and Oswald (2005) and Bell, Nickell, and
Quintini (2002) for the US and Baltagi, Blien, and Wolf (2007) for Germany.
This allows to disentangle the short and long-run wage and employment ef-
fects of migration if labor markets do not respond instantaneously to labor
supply shocks.
More speci¯cally, we estimate the elasticity of the wage with respect to
the unemployment rate by experience and education groups as
lnwijt = ¯ij lnwij;t¡1 + ´ij lnuijt + °ij ¿ijt + eijt; (12)
where ´ denotes the elasticity between the wage and the unemployment rate
and ¿ a deterministic time trend. We consider a linear and a squared trend
here. The error term eijt is speci¯ed as a one-way error component model
with ¯xed e®ects for each education-experience group. Since unemployment
might be endogenous, we follow Blanch°ower and Oswald (2005) and Baltagi,
Blien, and Wolf (2007) and instrument the unemployment rate with the ¯rst,
second, and third lag of the unemployment rate.
The model is estimated separately for each education and experience cell.
In each regression we have pooled two experience groups together in order to
achieve more stable results. We have not distinguished between natives and
foreigners, assuming that the wage-setting mechanism provides equal wages
in each education-experience cell.
Table 2 about here
The estimation results are displayed in Table 2. We have in all regressions
the expected negative sign for the coe±cient on the unemployment rate. The
autoregressive parameter on the lagged wage is well below 1, supporting a
wage curve rather than a Phillips curve. Moreover, in most regressions the
short-run and the long-run elasticities between the wage and the unemploy-
ment rate are highly signi¯cant. We obtain only insigni¯cant results in the
group of workers with a high school degree and university degree and the
19most extensive work experience, suggesting that the responsiveness of wages
to the unemployment rate is close to zero in this segment of the labor market.
The ¯rst regressions provide estimates of the wage curve for all groups and
for each education group separately. In the regression where all education-
experience groups are pooled, we ¯nd a short-run elasticity of about -0.03 and
a long-run elasticity of about -0.12. This is slightly higher than the average
elasticity of -0.08 found by the regional-level wage curve literature in other
OECD countries, but much higher than the elasticity of -0.03 estimated by
Baltagi, Blien, and Wolf (2007) at the regional level in Germany.
Interestingly enough, the long-run elasticities are high at both ends of
the skill spectrum: in the labor market segment without a vocational degree
we ¯nd a long-run elasticity of about -0.14, and in the high-skilled segment
of individuals with a university degree a long-run elasticity of -0.16. The
elasticity is particularly low in the segment with a vocational training degree,
i.e., the labor market segment with a high share of unionized workers.
Even more intriguing is our ¯nding of extremely high elasticities in seg-
ments with low work experience. Here we obtain long-run elasticities of
between -0.24 and -0.63. For workers without a vocational degree the elas-
ticities are particularly high. They decline monotonously with increasing
work experience in all cells of our sample and are particularly low in the
labor segment with work experience of more than 30 years.
The ¯xed e®ects speci¯cations reported in Table 2 are subject to the
Nickell (1981) bias of order 1=T. T = 23 in our sample. Monte Carlo sim-
ulations suggest that the coe±cients for the unemployment rate are slightly
overstated in samples of this time dimension. We have also employed the
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator for obtaining unbiased and con-
sistent results. The GMM estimates yield slightly lower results than the
standard ¯xed e®ects model, but are generally in line with the previous ¯nd-
ings (see Table A4). The overall elasticity is, at -0.8, lower than our ¯ndings,
but the elasticities for the individual education groups are comparable with
the IV-estimation results. Since the Sargan test statistics indicate that the
GMM model su®ers from overidenti¯cation, we use the standard IV-¯xed
e®ects estimation results for the simulation of the migration e®ects.
Altogether, our empirical ¯ndings support the hypothesis that wages re-
spond to an increase in the unemployment rate, and, hence, to labor supply
shocks.
5.2 Capital adjustment
The impact of migration on aggregate wages depends largely on the adjust-
ment of the capital stock. The Kaldor (1961) stylized facts on economic
20growth suggest that the capital-output ratio remains constant over time,
indicating that capital stocks adjust to changes in labor supply.
The OECD data on capital stocks indeed demonstrate that the capital-
output ratio has increased only slightly from about 3.0 to 3.15 in Germany
during the four decades since 1960. Moreover, the °uctuations around the
long-run ratio of 3.1 are relatively low. Even German reuni¯cation did not
result in a visible break in the time series.
We employ two speci¯cations for analyzing the impact of the labor supply
on the capital-output ratio. First, to analyze whether a change in the labor
supply a®ects the steady-state level of the capital-output ratio, we estimate
ln·t = ¯0 + ¯1 ln·t¡1 + ¯2 lnNt + ¯3¿t + "t; (13)
and, second, to analyze the short-term deviation of · from its long-term
growth path
ln·t = °0 + °1 ln·t¡1 + °2¢lnNt + °3¿t + ²t; (14)
where ·t denotes, as above, the capital-output ratio, Nt the total labor force,
¿t a deterministic time trend which captures the balanced growth path tra-
jectory of ln(·t) , and "t and ²t, disturbances which are assumed to be white
noise. We have moreover added a dummy variable that controls for a possible
structural break after German reuni¯cation.
Table 3 about here
The results are displayed in Table 3. The coe±cient on ln(Nt) is positive
and insigni¯cant in the ¯rst equation, suggesting that the labor supply does
not a®ect the capital-output ratio on the balanced growth path. In the second
equation, the coe±cient on the di®erence in the labor force is negative but
not signi¯cant from zero.
Thus, we ¯nd no signi¯cant evidence that a change in labor supply has
a short-run impact on the capital-output ratio. In the simulations on the
migration impact, we assume that the capital-output ratio remains constant
in the long run, while we use the small negative coe±cient on the ¯rst dif-
ference of the log labor force from the second regression for the simulations
of the short-run impact.
215.3 Elasticity of substitution between natives and for-
eigners
The model outlined in Section 3 relies on the assumption that ¯rms hire
workers until the marginal product of workers equals the wage rate. This
allows us to identify the parameters of the production function analogously
to Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) by the elasticities of relative
labor demand.
Let us start with the identi¯cation of the elasticity of substitution be-
tween native and foreign workers. The relative demand of native and foreign
workers of education i and experience j can be expressed as




For identifying the ratio µijh=µijf, we employ dummy variables for each
education-experience cell. Conditional on these controls, we assume that
changes in the relative employment of natives and foreigners in each
education-experience cell are due to random shocks in the labor supply. We
thus estimate the following regression to identify ¾i:
ln(wijht=wijft) = Dij ¡
1
¾i
ln(Lijht=Lijft) + ºijt; (15)
where the error term ºijt is a zero-mean random disturbance. In total we
have i £ j £ t = 800 observations. We estimate the equations by OLS and
weighted OLS using total employment in each cell as a weight.
Table 4 about here
The results are reported in Table 4. We ran the regressions separately
for the total period 1980-2004 and for the subperiod 1984 to 1993, when
Germany experienced a particular labor supply shock. In the total period,
the coe±cient for ¾i is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in all regressions except
for the groups of workers with a university degree, providing support for
the hypothesis that native and foreign workers are imperfect substitutes in
the ¯rst three education groups. However, the estimated coe±cients for
1/¾i are, at between 0.05 and 0.07, relatively small. This indicates that the
elasticity of substitution between native and foreign workers lies between 15
and 20, which is relatively high. Moreover, the elasticity of substitution is
not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in the weighted regression for high-skilled
22workers, suggesting that natives and foreigners are perfect substitutes in the
high-skilled segment of the labor market. For the subperiod 1984-1993, we
obtain very similar results, although the estimated coe±cients are slightly
larger and the standard errors slightly higher.
These results contrast with the relatively low elasticities found by Otta-
viano and Peri (2006) for the US, but do not support the ¯nding that natives
and migrants are perfect substitutes (Aydemir and Borjas, 2007). The esti-
mates by D'Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2008) for Germany are, at between
0.04-0.06, very close to ours. Similarly, Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler (2008)
estimate this elasticity based on another dataset at between 0.07 and 0.1.
For the further analysis, we use the education-speci¯c estimates of the
parameter ¾i since the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the coe±cient
is equal for all ¾i.
5.4 Elasticity of substitution between experience
groups
In the next step we estimate the elasticity of substitution between experience
groups. We ¯rst calculate the productivity weighted labor composite Lijt.
The estimates for the productivity parameters of native and foreign workers
can be derived from the estimated ¯xed e®ects as
^ µijh =
exp( ^ Dij)
1 + exp( ^ Dij)
; ^ µijf =
1
1 + exp( ^ Dij)
;
where we have used the restriction that the productivity terms add up to one.





































We identify the elasticity of substitution ½ by estimating
lnwijt = Dt + Dit + Dij ¡
1
½
ln ^ Lijt + Àijt; (16)
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ln(Lit) and the education-experience
group ¯xed e®ects Dij for the productivity term lnµij, which is assumed to
be constant over time. This allows us to consistently estimate the parameter
¡1
½ by 2SLS, where we use the number of native workers in each experience-
education group as an instrument.
Table 5 about here
We ¯nd an elasticity of substitution of about 30 in the regressions that
refer to the total period, which is substantially higher than the elasticity of
substitution of between 4 and 5, which Borjas (2003), Card and Lemieux
(2001) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) obtain in their studies for the US.7
Interestingly enough, Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler (2008) obtain similar
elasticities for Germany as we do, although they employ another dataset
for their analysis. As a robustness check we have also assumed an in¯nite
elasticity of substitution between native and foreign workers in the calculation
of Lijt, which yields however very similar results. In the subperiod 1984 -
1993 we estimate a coe±cient 0.064, which corresponds to an elasticity of
substitution in the vicinity of 16 (see Table 5).
5.5 Elasticity of substitution between education
groups
Analogously to the previous section we use the estimated ¯xed e®ects ^ Dij to




j exp( ^ Dij)
;
which in turn allows to compute the estimated value of the productivity










7In their recent study on Germany, D'Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2008) do not provide
estimates for the elasticity of substitution across experience and education groups but use
the US estimates.

















which enables us to identify the parameter 1
± as
lnwit = Dt + Di + ¸i¿i ¡
1
±
ln ^ Lit + #it: (17)











± ln(Lt) and the education-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects Di and the education-speci¯c
deterministic time trend ¿i for the variance in the skill-speci¯c e±ciency
parameter µit. #it is assumed to be a zero-mean random disturbance. To
estimate the parameter ¡1
± consistently, we again employ the 2SLS estimator
and use the number of foreign workers within each education group as an
instrument for ln ^ Lit.
Table 6 about here
We receive for 1=± an estimated parameter of about 0.15 in the total
sample period, which corresponds to an elasticity of substitution between
education groups of 6.5 (see Table 6). This elasticity is larger than the
elasticities found in US studies (e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1992; Ottaviano and
Peri, 2006), but again matches the ¯ndings by Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler
(2008) for Germany. As a robustness check we apply the assumption that the
elasticity ½ tends to in¯nity for the calculation of Lt, which yields a similar
elasticity of substitution. In the subperiod 1984-1993 we ¯nd an elasticity of
substitution of about 3, which is similar to the ¯ndings in the US literature
(Table 6).
Finally, the parameter ® has been calculated from the labor share in
national income which yields an average value of 0.67.
6 Simulation results
We now use the estimated parameter values for the simulation of the impact
of migration on (un-)employment and wages. In each scenario, we distinguish
between the short-run and the long-run e®ects of migration. For the sim-
ulation of the short-run e®ects we employ the short-run coe±cients for the
25elasticity ^ ´ij from the wage curve estimates and the (small) negative e®ect
of an increase in the labor force on the capital-output ratio. The long-run
e®ects are calculated by using the long-run elasticities of the wage curve and
by assuming that the capital-output ratio remains constant.
We simulate the following scenarios here. First, we simulate the e®ects
of a one percent increase of the labor force through immigration using the
average distribution of foreigners across the education-experience cells of the
labor market. This implies that the overwhelming majority of the increase
takes place in the education group of those with no vocational training, while
the increase in the other education groups is modest. This scenario provides
an indication as to the marginal e®ects of immigration at the given structure
of the workforce.
In order to analyze the sensitivity of our ¯ndings, we simulate a coun-
terfactual scenario under the assumption that labor markets are perfectly
°exible, i.e., that ´ij ! ¡1 8 ij. This scenario allows us to compare our
¯ndings with those reported in the standard literature (e.g. Borjas, 2003;
Ottaviano and Peri, 2006).
In the next step we simulate the wage and employment e®ects of immi-
gration for the total sample period, i.e., from 1980 to 2004. We consider the
actual changes in each cell of the labor market here. Finally, we simulate
the labor market e®ects of the labor supply shock during the ten-year period
1984 - 1993, which covers the fall of the Berlin wall.
The employment and wage e®ects are calculated for native and for-
eign workers for each education-experience group. For the aggregation, we
weighted the wage changes by the income share in each cell, and the changes
in the unemployment rate by the share in the labor force in each cell. In the
tables, we report the average e®ects for the total labor force, the native labor
force, and the foreign labor force by education levels.
Table 7 about here
A one percent immigration of workers with the same education and expe-
rience characteristics as the existing foreign workforce reduces average wages
by less than 0.1 percent and increases the average unemployment rate by
less than 0.1 percent in the short run, while the long-run impact is neutral.
Particularly negatively a®ected are workers with no vocational training de-
gree and a high school degree, where the shares of the foreign workforce are
relatively high. The native workforce bene¯ts slightly on average both from
increasing wages and from declining unemployment. However, native work-
ers lose slightly in the segments with no vocational degree and a high school
26degree. In contrast, wages of foreign workers tend to decline by about 0.6
percent, while the unemployment rate increases by 0.3 percentage points in
the short run and 0.1 percentage points in the long run (Table 7).
Table 8 about here
In Table 8 we have simulated the potential wage impact of one percent
immigration under the counterfactual assumption of perfect labor markets.
We ¯nd slightly higher wage e®ects than in the previous scenario, but the
overall pattern is the same: average wages of the total labor force decrease
slightly in the short run while immigration is neutral in the long run. While
wages of native workers tend to increase slightly, those of foreign workers
tend to decline by 0.6 percent in the short run. The pattern of our ¯ndings
is similar to that in the ¯ndings of Ottaviano and Peri (2006) for the US, but
both the wage losses of the foreign workforce and the wage gains of the native
workforce are much smaller in our case since the elasticity of substitution
between native and foreign workers is higher in Germany.
The real labor supply shock during the 1980 - 2004 period changed the
structure of the foreign workforce: while the number of workers without a vo-
cational degree declined substantially, the labor supply of foreigners increased
substantially in the other education groups of the labor market. Particularly
a®ected was the rather small group with a high school degree, but the groups
with a vocational degree and a university degree faced a substantial labor
supply shock as well during this period. Average wages declined by about 0.1
percent in the short run and remained stable in the long run. Interestingly
enough, the unemployment rate decreased in the short run, but increased
slightly in the long run. This counterintuitive ¯nding can be traced back to
the fact that the change in the composition of the foreign workforce reduced
the unemployment rate in the labor market segment without a vocational
degree. The positive employment e®ects there overcompensated for the in-
creasing unemployment in the other segments of the labor market. However,
in the long run, wages adjust such that the employment gains in the low-
skilled segment of the labor market are mitigated.
The wage impact of migration on the native labor force is almost neu-
tral, but natives tend to bene¯t by a slightly decreasing unemployment rate
in the short run. The foreign labor force experiences a substantial wage
loss of about 1.2 percent in the short run and 1 percent in the long run.
The unemployment rate declines in the short run by about 0.3 percentage
points, but increases in the long-run by 0.4 percentage points. Note that the
27unemployment rate of foreign workers without a vocational degree declines
substantially by 4.1 percentage points in the short run, but that this decline
shrinks to 0.9 percentage points when wages have adjusted in the long run.
Altogether, wages of foreign workers are adversely a®ected by the increasing
labor supply, while the impact on unemployment is ambiguous due to the
change in the skill composition of the foreign workforce (Table 8).
Table 9 about here
Finally, we simulated the e®ects of the immigration shock during the 1984-
1993 period, when the foreign workforce increases by about 40 percent. This
labor supply shock means that average wages decline by almost 0.2 percent,
while the average unemployment rate increases by 0.4 percentage points in
the short run. Nevertheless, the wage impact of migration is neutral in the
long run, while the unemployment rate increases by less than 0.2 percentage
points. Interestingly enough, the native workforce tends to gain both in terms
of higher wages and lower unemployment. In the long run, native wages
increase by more than 0.2 percent, while the unemployment rate declines
by more than 0.1 percentage points. In contrast, wages of the foreign labor
force decline by almost 3 per cent. The unemployment rate of the foreign
workforce increases by 2.6 percentage points in the short run and by 1.4
percentage points in the long run. Particularly a®ected are the groups with
a high school degree and a vocational degree (Table 9).
7 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a general equilibrium framework that allows us
to analyze the wage and employment e®ects of migration simultaneously.
We modeled wage rigidities in form of a wage curve, which assumes that
wages respond imperfectly to an increase in the unemployment rate. In the
empirical application of the model we found that the elasticities of the wage
curve di®er widely for the di®erent segments of the labor market. While
the elasticity of the wage with respect to the unemployment rate is relatively
high in the segments of the labor market with a university degree and limited
work experience, it is particularly low in the labor market segment with a
vocational degree and extensive work experience.
At the given structure of the foreign workforce, migration reduces average
wages and increases unemployment of the total workforce slightly, while it
is neutral in the long run. More interesting are the structural e®ects: while
28native workers tend to bene¯t, the foreign workforce tends to su®er from
lower wages and increasing unemployment, at least in the short run.
The simulation of the actual immigration impact demonstrates that the
shift in the skill structure of the foreign labor force can reduce the total
unemployment rate if wage rigidities exist. A decreasing labor supply in the
low-skilled segment of the labor market and an increasing labor supply in
the segments with a higher skill level can reduce the overall unemployment
rate if wages do not completely adjust to labor demand changes. Indeed,
we ¯nd that immigration during the 1980 - 2004 period has reduced total
unemployment in the short run, while this e®ect disappears in the long run
when wages have adjusted.
Moreover, our empirical analysis has produced further intriguing results.
Compared to the ¯ndings from the US studies, the elasticity of substitution
between natives and foreigners is relatively high in Germany. This implies
that the labor market e®ects of migration are relatively similar for natives and
migrants within the same education and experience cells. However, native
and foreign workers remain imperfect substitutes.
The elasticity of substitution across education groups is about twice as
high in Germany as in the US, and the elasticity of substitution across experi-
ence groups is substantially larger. As a consequence, the e®ects of migration
are more evenly distributed across the education and experience groups of
the labor market in Germany than in the US.
Finally, we found strong evidence that capital stocks adjust to labor sup-
ply shocks. We found no negative relationship between labor supply and
the capital-output ratio in the long run, and only small and insigni¯cant
e®ects for short-term supply shocks. This supports one of the famous styl-
ized facts on economic growth by Nicholas Kaldor (1961) and the evidence
that Ottaviano and Peri (2006) found for the US. This again has important
implications for the wage e®ects of migration: at least in the long run, an
increasing labor supply through migration does not reduce the average wage
level in the economy.
References
Arellano, M., and S. Bond (1991): \Some Tests of Speci¯cation for
Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment
Equations," Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277{97.
Aydemir, A., and G. J. Borjas (2007): \Cross-Country Variation in
29the Impact of International Migration: Canada, Mexico and the United
States," Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(4), 663{708.
Baltagi, B. H., and U. Blien (1998): \The German wage curve: evidence
from the IAB employment sample," Economic Letters, 61, 135 { 142.
Baltagi, B. H., U. Blien, and K. Wolf (2007): \Philipps Curve or
Wage Curve: Evidence from West Germany: 1980-2004," IAB Discussion
Paper 14/2007.
Bauer, T., and K. F. Zimmermann (1997): \Unemployment and wages
of ethnic Germans," Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 37, 361
{ 377.
Bell, B., S. Nickell, and G. Quintini (2002): \Wage equations, wage
curves and all that," Labour Economics, 9, 341{360.
Bentolila, S., J. J. Dolado, and J. F. Jimeno (2007): \Does Immigra-
tion A®ect the Philipps Curve? Some Evidence for Spain," Kiel Working
Papers 1333, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel.
Blanchard, O. J. (2003): Macroeconomics, 3rd Edition. London.
Blanchard, O. J., and L. F. Katz (1997): \What we know and do
not know about the natural rate of unemployment," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 11(1), 51{72.
Blanchflower, D. D., and A. J. Oswald (1994a): The wage curve.
Cambridge MA.
(1995): \An introduction to the wage curve," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 9, 153{165.
(2005): \The wage curve reloaded," NBER Working Paper 11338.
Boeri, T., and H. BrÄ ucker (2005): \Why are Europeans so tough on
migrants?," Economic Policy, 44, 631{703.
Bonin, H. (2005): \Wage and employment e®ects of immigration to Ger-
many: evidence from a skill group approach," IZA Discussion Paper 1875.
Bonin, H., B. RaffelhÄ uschen, and J. Walliser (2000): \Can Immi-
gration Alleviate the Demographic Burden," FinanzArchiv, 57, 1{21.
30Borjas, G. J. (2003): \The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Slop-
ing: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market,"
CXVIII(4), 1335{1374.
Borjas, G. J., R. Freemann, and L. Katz (1997): \How Much do Im-
migration and Trade A®ect Labor Market Outcomes?," Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, (1), 1{90.
Borjas, G. J., J. Grogger, and G. H. Hanson (2006): \Immigra-
tion and African-American Employment Opportunities: The Response of
Wages, Employment, and Incaceration to Labor Supply Shocks," NBER
Working Paper 12518.
BrÄ ucker, H., and P. TrÄ ubswetter (2007): \Do the Best Go West?
An Analysis of the Self-Selection of Employed East-West Migrants in Ger-
many," Empirica, 34, 371 { 395.
Bundesamt, S. (2006): \Informationen zur Ost-West Wanderung," Statis-
tisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden.
Burda, M. C., and J. Hunt (2001): \From German Reuni¯cation to Eco-
nomic Integration: Productivity and the Labor Market in Eastern Ger-
many," Brooking Papers of Economic Activity, 2:2001, 1{91.
BÄ uttner, T., and S. RÄ assler (2007): \Imputation," Mimeo, IAB,
NÄ urnberg.
Card, D. (1990): \The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor
Market," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 245{257.
(1995): \The wage curve: a review," Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 33, 785{799.
(2001): \Immigrant In°ows, Native Out°ows, and the Local Labor
Market Impacts of Higher Immigration," Journal of Labor Economics, 19,
22{64.
Card, D., and T. Lemieux (2001): \Can Falling Supply Explain the
Rising Return to College for Younger Men? A Cohort Based Analysis,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVI, 705{746.
Carrington, W. J., and P. DeLima (1996): \The Impact of the 1970s
Repatriates from Africa on the Portuguese Labour Market," Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, 49, 330{346.
31D'Amuri, F., G. Ottaviano, and G. Peri (2008): \The Labor Market
Impact of Immigration in Western Germany in the 1990's," NBER Working
Paper No. 13851, March.
DeNew, J., and K. F. Zimmermann (1994): \Native Wage Impacts of
Foreign Labor: A Random E®ects Panel Analysis," Journal of Population
Economics, 7, 177{192.
Felbermayr, G., W. Geis, and W. Kohler (2008): \Absorbing German
Immigration: Wages and Employment," Mimeo, University of TÄ ubingen.
Fitzenberger, B., A. Osikominu, and R. VÄ olter (2005): \Imputa-
tion Rules to Improve the Education Variable in the IAB Employment
Subsample," ZEW Discussion Paper No 05-10; Mannheim.
Freeman, R. (2006): \People Flows in Globalization," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 9(2), 23{44.
Friedberg, R. M., and J. Hunt (1995): \The Impact of Immigrants
on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 9, 23{44.
Guichard, S., and J.-P. Laffargue (2000): \The wage curve: the lessons
of an estimation over a panel of countries," CEPII, Document de travail
no. 2000-21.
Haisken-DeNew, J., and K. F. Zimmermann (1995): \Wage and Mo-
bility E®ects of Trade and Migration," CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 1318.
Harris, J. R., and M. Todaro (1970): \Migration unemployment and
development: a two sector analysis," American Economic Review, 60, 126
{ 142.
Hatizius, J. (1994): \The Unemployment and Earnings E®ect of German
Immigration," Applied Economics Discussion Paper No. 165, Oxford In-
stitute for Economics and Statistics.
Hunt, J. (1992): \The Impact of the 1962 Repatriates from Algeria on the
French Labor Market," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 45, 556{
572.
(2006): \Staunching Emigration from East Germany: Age and the
Determinants of Migration," Journal of the European Economic Associa-
tion, 4(5), 1014 { 1037.
32Inada, K.-I. (1963): \On a Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth: Com-
ments and a Generalization," Review of Economic Studies, 30, 119{127.
Jaeger, D. (1996): \Skill Di®erences and the E®ects of Immigrants on the
Wages of Natives," Working Paper, U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics.
Kaldor, N. (1961): \Capital accumulation and economic growth," in The
Theory of Capital, ed. by F. Lutz, and D. Hague. St. Martins, New York.
Katz, L., and K. Murphy (1992): \Change in Relative Wages 1963-1987:
Supply and Demand Factors," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 35 {
78.
Layard, R., S. Nickell, and R. Jackman (1991): Unemployment:
Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market. Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Layard, R., and S. J. Nickell (1986): \Unemployment in Brtain," Eco-
nomica, 53, Supplement 1986, S121{S169.
Levine, P. (1999): \The welfare economics of migration control," Journal
of Population Economics, 12, 23{43.
Lindbeck, A. (1993): Unemployment and Macroeconomics. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Longhi, S., P. Nijkamp, and J. Poot (2005): \A Meta-Analytic As-
sessment of the E®ects of Immigration on Wages," Journal of Economic
Surveys, 19(3), 451{477.
(2006): \The Impact of Immigration on the Employment of Natives
in Regional Labour Markets: A Meta-Analysis," IZA Discussion Paper
2044, Bonn.
MÄ uhleisen, M., and K. F. Zimmermann (1994): \A Panel Analysis of
Job Changes and Unemployment," European Economic Review, 38, 793{
801.
Nickell, S. (1981): \Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed E®ects," Econo-
metrica, 49(6), 1417 { 1426.
Nijkamp, P., and J. Poot (2005): \The last word on the wage curve? A
meta-analytic assessment," Journal of Economic Surveys, 19, 421{450.
33Ottaviano, G., and G. Peri (2005a): \Cities and Cultures," Journal of
Urban Economics, 58(2), 304 { 307.
(2005b): \Rethinking the Gains from Immigration: Theory and
Evidence from the US," NBER Working Paper 11672.
(2006): \Rethinking the E®ects of Immigration on Wages," NBER
Working Paper 12497.
Phillips, A. W. (1958): \The relation between unemployment and the
rate of change of money wage rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957,"
Economica, 25(100), 283{299.
Pischke, J. S., and J. Velling (1997): \Employment e®ects of immigra-
tion to Germany: an analysis based on local labor markets," Review of
Economics and Statistics, 79, 594{604.
Sargan, J. D. (1964): \Wages and Prices in the United Kingdom: A
Study in Econometric Methodology," in Econometrics and quantitative
economics, ed. by D. Hendry, and K. Wallis. Basil Blackwell, New York.
Shapiro, C., and J. E. Stiglitz (1984): \Equilibrium unemployment as
a worker discipline device," American Economic Review, 74, 433 { 444.
Wagner, T., and E. J. Jahn (2004): Neue Arbeitsmarkttheorien, 2nd
edition. Lucius and Lucius, Stuttgart.
Wong, K.-Y. (1995): International Trade in Goods and Factor Mobility.
MIT-Press.
World Bank (2007): World Development Indicators. World Bank, Wash-
ington, DC.
Zimmermann, K. F. (1999): \Ethnic German Migration since 1989 - Re-
sults and Perspectives," IZA Discussion Paper 50.
34A Appendix
The general solution for the marginal employment response is given by equa-




























where we have used the de¯nition of ·. Using the nested structure of the






















































Note that we have from the nested structure of the production function





































































































@Lijk is the partial derivative of the wage with respect to labor in the
35same education, experience and nationality cell of the labor market,
@wijk
@Lijk0
the partial derivative of the wage with respect to labor of the same education
and experience, but di®erent nationality,
@wijk
@Lij0m the partial derivative of the
wage with respect to labor of the same education, but di®erent experience,
@wijk
@Li0nm the partial derivative of the wage with respect to labor of di®erent
education, and sijk, sij, si, etc. denote the share of wages paid to workers in
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Substituting (A.1) to (A.4) for the individual terms in equation (4) yields
the explicit solution for the employment response which we have used for our
simulation of the employment response to migration.
36Table 1: Description of dataset (Western Germany, 1980 - 2004)
1980 - 2004 1984 - 1993
observations percent observations percent
all spells 11,770,638 100.0 4,460,817 100.0
minus part time workers / trainees 2,698,193 22.9 825,012 18.5
minus age (below 15 and above 60) 163,940 1.4 56,239 1.3
minus missing nationality 1,044 0.0 216 0.0
minus missing education 176,876 1.5 66,763 1.5
minus wages below social
security contribution threshold 81,716 0.7 15,033 0.3
total 8,648,869 73.5 3,497,554 78.4
Source: Authors' calculations based on the IABS.
37Table 2: The wage curve: IV-estimation results
lnwij;t¡1 lnuijt
education short-run long-run
degree coe®. se coe®. se coe®. se R2
all experience groups
all 0.731 (0.023) ¤¤¤ -0.032 (0.005) ¤¤¤ -0.119 (0.019) ¤¤¤ 0.85
no vocational 0.691 (0.051) ¤¤¤ -0.044 (0.006) ¤¤¤ -0.142 (0.031) ¤¤¤ 0.94
vocational 0.523 (0.052) ¤¤¤ -0.047 (0.006) ¤¤¤ -0.098 (0.015) ¤¤¤ 0.96
high school 0.466 (0.064) ¤¤¤ -0.067 (0.017) ¤¤¤ -0.125 (0.030) ¤¤¤ 0.83
university 0.366 (0.064) ¤¤¤ -0.100 (0.017) ¤¤¤ -0.157 (0.023) ¤¤¤ 0.86
experience group 1 and 2
no vocational 0.916 (0.117) ¤¤¤ -0.053 (0.013) ¤¤¤ -0.626 (0.953) 0.81
vocational 0.799 (0.086) ¤¤¤ -0.048 (0.008) ¤¤¤ -0.237 (0.124) ¤ 0.98
high school 0.830 (0.114) ¤¤¤ -0.065 (0.017) ¤¤¤ -0.380 (0.311) 0.97
university 0.625 (0.109) ¤¤¤ -0.118 (0.021) ¤¤¤ -0.313 (0.104) ¤¤¤ 0.88
experience group 3 and 4
no vocational 0.370 (0.116) ¤¤¤ -0.080 (0.015) ¤¤¤ -0.127 (0.028) ¤¤¤ 0.96
vocational 0.293 (0.114) ¤¤¤ -0.073 (0.013) ¤¤¤ -0.103 (0.020) ¤¤¤ 0.95
high school 0.358 (0.136) ¤¤¤ -0.075 (0.026) ¤¤¤ -0.117 (0.037) ¤¤¤ 0.94
university 0.473 (0.101) ¤¤¤ -0.115 (0.037) ¤¤¤ -0.217 (0.069) ¤¤¤ 0.90
experience group 5 and 6
no vocational 0.419 (0.118) ¤¤¤ -0.065 (0.015) ¤¤¤ -0.111 (0.023) ¤¤¤ 0.96
vocational 0.401 (0.127) ¤¤¤ -0.057 (0.017) ¤¤¤ -0.095 (0.023) ¤¤¤ 0.87
high school 0.455 (0.152) ¤¤¤ -0.088 (0.038) ¤¤ -0.162 (0.056) ¤¤¤ 0.62
university 0.294 (0.138) ¤¤ -0.092 (0.035) ¤¤¤ -0.131 (0.041) ¤¤¤ 0.82
experience group 7 and 8
no vocational 0.406 (0.125) ¤¤¤ -0.059 (0.014) ¤¤¤ -0.099 (0.018) ¤¤¤ 0.98
vocational 0.179 (0.150) -0.064 (0.016) ¤¤¤ -0.078 (0.016) ¤¤¤ 0.96
high school 0.358 (0.149) ¤¤ -0.068 (0.054) -0.106 (0.076) 0.43
university 0.300 (0.253) -0.058 (0.063) -0.083 (0.065) 0.86
Notes: Dependent variable is lnwijt, i.e. the log wage in each education-experience
group. White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, ¤ de-
note the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-signi¯cance levels. The model is estimated by 2SLS. The
unemployment rate is instrumented by its ¯rst, second and third lag. The model is
speci¯ed as a one-way error component model with group speci¯c ¯xed e®ects and
contains a deterministic time trend and a squared deterministic time trend for each
experience group. The regressions for each education-experience group are based on
44 observations, the regressions in each education group on 176 observations, and the
overall regression on 704 observations.
38Table 3: Impact of labor supply shocks on the capital-output ratio
dependent variable: ln·t model (1) model (2)






adjusted R2 0.611 0.615
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.468 1.388
Notes: White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, ¤ de-
note the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-signi¯cance levels. Each regression includes a constant
and a deterministic time trend.
Table 4: Partial elasticity of native - foreign wages, 1=¾i
1980 - 2004 1984 - 1993
all workers weighted all workers weighted
1/¾i 1/¾i 1/¾i 1/¾i
all 0.060 ¤¤¤ 0.053 ¤¤¤ 0.073 ¤¤¤ 0.056 ¤¤¤
(0.006) (0.003) (0.016) (0.007)
no vocational 0.084 ¤¤¤ 0.070 ¤¤¤ 0.076 ¤¤¤ 0.058 ¤¤¤
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
vocational 0.048 ¤¤¤ 0.051 ¤¤¤ 0.050 ¤¤¤ 0.054 ¤¤¤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
high school 0.046 ¤¤¤ 0.050 ¤¤¤ 0.076 0.131 ¤¤¤
(0.016) (0.014) (0.048) (0.034)
university 0.071 ¤¤¤ 0.011 0.113 ¤ 0.022
(0.023) (0.023) (0.069) (0.063)
observations 800 800 320 320
F-test 16.92 9.30 4.14 5.64
p-value 0% 5% 39% 23%
Notes: White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, ¤ de-
note the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-signi¯cance levels. Dependent variable is ln(wijht=wijft),
i.e. the relative daily wage of native to foreign workers within the same education-
experience cell. The explanatory variable is the relative employment of native
and foreign workers within the same education-experience cell. All regressions in-
clude education-by-experience group ¯xed e®ects. Observations in speci¯cation 2 are
weighted by total employment in the cell. The F-statistic tests the Null hypothesis
that all coe±cients 1=¾i are identical across educational groups.
39Table 5: Partial wage elasticity across education-experience cells, 1=½
1980-2004 1984-1993
CES-weighted sum native and CES-weighted sum native and
labor composite foreign labor force labor composite foreign labor force
(using estimated ¾i) (¾i ! 1) (using estimated ¾i) (¾i ! 1)
lnLijt 0.031 ¤¤¤ 0.031 ¤¤¤ 0.064 ¤¤¤ 0.063 ¤¤¤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
observations 800 800 320 320
Notes: White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, ¤
denote the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-signi¯cance levels. Dependent variable is lnwijt, i.e.
the log daily wage in each education-experience cell. The equation is estimated by 2SLS
using the log of employed foreign-born workers in the respective education-experience
group as an instrument for the variable lnLijt. All regressions include education by
experience ¯xed e®ects and education by year ¯xed e®ects and time ¯xed e®ects.
Table 6: Partial wage elasticity across education cells, 1=±
1980-2004 1984-1993
CES-weighted sum native and CES-weighted sum native and
labor composite foreign labor force labor composite foreign labor force
(using estimated ½) (½ ! 1) (using estimated ½) (½ ! 1)
lnLit 0.153 ¤¤ 0.147 ¤¤ 0.306 0.296
(0.076) (0.072) (0.213) (0.201)
observations 100 100 40 40
Notes: White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, ¤
denote the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-signi¯cance levels. Dependent variable is lnwit, i.e. the
log wage in each education cell. The equation is estimated by 2SLS using the log of
employed foreign-born workers in the respective education group as an instrument for
the variable lnLit. All regressions include ¯xed time e®ects, education group ¯xed
e®ects and education-speci¯c time trends.
40Table 7: Simulation of migration e®ects on wages and unemployment
short-run results long-run results
education unemployment unemployment
degree wages rate wages rate
wages: change in % at an immigration of 1%
unemployment rate: change in %-points
total labor force
all -0.04 0.05 -0.00 0.01
no vocational -0.16 0.10 -0.13 0.02
vocational 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.01
high school -0.14 0.24 -0.11 0.17
university -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.01
native labor force
all 0.02 -0.00 0.06 -0.01
no vocational -0.04 0.02 -0.00 0.00
vocational 0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.02
high school -0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.01
university -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.00
foreign labor force
all -0.58 0.32 -0.55 0.12
no vocational -0.53 0.31 -0.52 0.05
vocational -0.69 0.31 -0.65 0.18
high school -1.53 1.32 -1.54 0.71
university -0.21 0.09 -0.17 0.05
Notes: The short-run simulations are based on the short-run semi-elasticities of the
wage curve and consider the short-run impact of migration on the capital-output ratio.
The long-run results are based on the long-run elasticities of the wage curve and a con-
stant capital-output ratio. The e®ects have been calculated for natives and foreigners
at each education-experience level separately. Aggregate wage ¯gures are calculated by
weighting each cell with the income share, aggregate unemployment ¯gures by weight-
ing each cell with the share in the labor force.
41Table 8: Simulation of migration e®ects: clearing labor markets
all natives foreigners
education short-run long-run short-run long-run short-run long-run
degree results results results results results results
wages: change in % at an immigration of 1%
all -0.04 -0.00 0.02 0.06 -0.60 -0.56
no vocational -0.17 -0.13 -0.04 -0.00 -0.56 -0.52
vocational 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.08 -0.70 -0.66
high school -0.16 -0.12 -0.07 -0.03 -1.65 -1.61
university -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.21 -0.17
Notes: Both simulations assume labor markets are perfectly °exible, i.e. that ´ ! ¡1.
The short-run simulations consider the impact of immigration on the capital-output
ratio, the long-run simulations assume a constant capital-output ratio. The e®ects have
been calculated for natives and foreigners at each education-experience level separately.
Aggregate wage ¯gures are calculated by weighting each cell with the income share,
aggregate unemployment ¯gures by weighting each cell with the share in the labor
force.
42Table 9: Simulation of migration e®ects, 1980-2004 and 1983-1993
1980 - 2004 1984 - 1993
short-run results long-run results short-run results long-run results
education unempl. unempl. unempl. unempl.
degree wage rate wages rate wages rate wages rate
wages: change in %, unemployment rate: change in %-points
total labor force
all -0.12 -0.03 0.00 0.09 -0.18 0.41 0.00 0.17
no vocational 1.52 -1.16 1.75 -0.29 -0.52 0.71 -0.45 0.17
vocational -0.38 0.24 -0.29 0.16 -0.06 0.27 0.15 0.13
high school -4.34 3.86 -4.45 2.77 -1.13 1.63 -1.08 1.06
university -1.38 0.47 -1.29 0.32 -0.19 0.28 0.02 0.16
native labor force
all -0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.24 -0.11
no vocational 1.09 -0.48 1.30 -0.13 -0.20 0.26 -0.11 0.03
vocational -0.08 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.14 -0.10 0.35 -0.16
high school -2.66 1.59 -2.73 0.97 -0.17 0.19 -0.05 0.05
university -1.23 0.38 -1.15 0.23 -0.10 0.04 0.11 -0.05
foreign labor force
all -1.17 -0.27 -0.97 0.38 -2.93 2.63 -2.89 1.44
no vocational 2.80 -4.11 3.13 -0.86 -1.58 2.05 -1.59 0.69
vocational -6.34 1.06 -6.30 0.57 -4.24 2.77 -4.14 1.78
high school -32.01 4.21 -32.86 2.10 -17.56 8.78 -18.63 5.49
university -3.23 0.37 -3.15 0.21 -1.59 0.83 -1.39 0.42
Notes: The short-run simulations are based on the short-run semi-elasticities of the
wage curve and consider the short-run impact of migration on the capital-output ratio.
The long-run results are based on the long-run elasticities of the wage curve and a con-
stant capital-output ratio. The e®ects have been calculated for natives and foreigners
at each education-experience level and then aggregated.
43Table A1: Share of foreigners by education and experience
education experience 1980 1984 1985 1990 1993 1995 2000 2004
no vocational 0-5 0.183 0.175 0.159 0.256 0.402 0.350 0.192 0.143
6-10 0.278 0.187 0.199 0.227 0.360 0.413 0.334 0.213
11-15 0.380 0.288 0.268 0.300 0.370 0.394 0.461 0.398
16-20 0.459 0.352 0.340 0.345 0.397 0.421 0.418 0.470
21-25 0.345 0.403 0.409 0.373 0.424 0.433 0.429 0.432
26-30 0.228 0.262 0.293 0.410 0.418 0.435 0.444 0.422
31-35 0.176 0.186 0.197 0.291 0.393 0.428 0.438 0.450
36-40 0.081 0.118 0.128 0.183 0.226 0.258 0.388 0.450
all 0.242 0.224 0.229 0.280 0.349 0.376 0.402 0.397
vocational 0-5 0.030 0.026 0.027 0.049 0.093 0.121 0.094 0.062
6-10 0.043 0.034 0.034 0.048 0.066 0.083 0.137 0.102
11-15 0.074 0.052 0.052 0.064 0.077 0.081 0.105 0.150
16-20 0.090 0.078 0.074 0.079 0.093 0.094 0.096 0.109
21-25 0.057 0.078 0.085 0.088 0.094 0.102 0.106 0.105
26-30 0.049 0.047 0.052 0.088 0.102 0.102 0.112 0.109
31-35 0.037 0.044 0.045 0.054 0.074 0.092 0.110 0.114
36-40 0.021 0.029 0.032 0.045 0.051 0.054 0.084 0.110
all 0.051 0.048 0.049 0.063 0.079 0.087 0.105 0.111
high school 0-5 0.039 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.033 0.051 0.064 0.049
6-10 0.083 0.043 0.034 0.036 0.035 0.038 0.069 0.072
11-15 0.117 0.097 0.087 0.056 0.056 0.050 0.055 0.077
16-20 0.075 0.113 0.127 0.111 0.087 0.077 0.071 0.066
21-25 0.084 0.088 0.084 0.150 0.144 0.126 0.090 0.080
26-30 0.064 0.074 0.082 0.082 0.120 0.157 0.145 0.108
31-35 0.030 0.061 0.065 0.074 0.085 0.096 0.164 0.144
36-40 0.019 0.031 0.036 0.076 0.073 0.075 0.091 0.133
all 0.065 0.059 0.057 0.057 0.062 0.065 0.078 0.080
university 0-5 0.060 0.034 0.031 0.045 0.049 0.055 0.092 0.113
6-10 0.084 0.052 0.046 0.040 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.081
11-15 0.087 0.080 0.072 0.057 0.052 0.050 0.048 0.054
16-20 0.078 0.081 0.083 0.087 0.073 0.067 0.057 0.056
21-25 0.059 0.077 0.078 0.083 0.099 0.096 0.071 0.060
26-30 0.050 0.053 0.054 0.076 0.074 0.085 0.098 0.076
31-35 0.048 0.047 0.045 0.056 0.075 0.077 0.081 0.102
36-40 0.025 0.028 0.049 0.042 0.045 0.050 0.047 0.063
all 0.071 0.062 0.059 0.061 0.063 0.063 0.062 0.070
Notes: Individuals included in the sample are between 15 and 60 years old and are
either employed or unemployed on September 30 of the respective year.
44Table A2: Daily wages of native workers by education and experience
(constant 2000 Euros)
education experience 1980 1984 1985 1990 1993 1995 2000 2004
no vocational 0-5 41 39 41 44 46 45 43 45
6-10 55 54 54 57 59 60 57 58
11-15 60 61 62 64 67 68 73 69
16-20 62 62 64 68 70 70 76 78
21-25 64 65 65 67 71 72 75 80
26-30 64 66 67 69 70 71 78 77
31-35 64 65 67 70 72 71 76 80
36-40 63 65 66 70 71 72 77 76
all 60 61 62 65 68 69 71 72
vocational 0-5 49 48 49 53 56 56 58 59
6-10 63 61 62 65 66 66 68 67
11-15 72 72 72 74 76 76 79 78
16-20 79 79 80 81 81 82 86 86
21-25 81 84 85 86 86 86 89 90
26-30 81 85 87 90 89 89 93 93
31-35 81 84 87 92 93 93 96 96
36-40 80 85 86 91 93 94 100 98
all 73 74 75 78 81 81 86 87
high school 0-5 58 57 57 61 64 65 68 68
6-10 78 75 75 78 82 81 85 85
11-15 92 93 94 93 95 95 104 102
16-20 105 103 104 104 104 104 112 114
21-25 112 114 114 109 109 109 114 115
26-30 112 119 120 118 114 112 119 119
31-35 117 127 126 120 123 120 125 121
36-40 111 127 131 128 122 119 130 120
all 90 89 88 87 90 91 101 103
university 0-5 87 92 92 94 96 93 105 95
6-10 110 119 118 121 125 122 141 138
11-15 129 141 144 137 144 144 160 168
16-20 139 160 159 156 154 153 175 180
21-25 143 166 166 166 168 166 181 186
26-30 143 171 173 170 174 175 195 188
31-35 139 171 170 177 179 177 204 199
36-40 127 154 164 169 171 171 207 187
all 123 140 141 140 144 144 164 168
Notes: Individuals included in the sample are between 15 and 60 years old, receive
non-zero income and work at least on September 30 of the respective year. Wages are
calculated in real Euro using the GDP de°ator (base year: 2000). Wages above the
social security ceiling are imputed.
45Table A3: Daily wages of foreign workers by education and experience
(constant 2000 Euros)
education experience 1980 1984 1985 1990 1993 1995 2000 2004
no vocational 0-5 47 47 47 50 46 46 44 43
degree 6-10 58 56 57 59 56 55 55 53
11-15 61 61 63 64 61 60 62 62
16-20 65 63 64 66 63 64 65 66
21-25 67 66 68 67 65 65 68 70
26-30 67 67 68 71 67 66 68 70
31-35 65 65 67 72 71 71 70 71
36-40 64 64 65 70 70 70 74 74
all 63 62 64 67 64 64 66 68
vocational 0-5 54 51 52 55 55 57 59 57
degree 6-10 63 61 62 65 62 63 67 67
11-15 70 68 68 70 68 68 71 75
16-20 74 73 75 73 70 71 74 75
21-25 75 76 77 78 73 73 76 78
26-30 74 76 77 81 78 77 76 78
31-35 72 73 75 81 80 80 80 78
36-40 71 73 75 77 79 80 84 82
all 70 70 72 74 71 71 74 76
high school 0-5 63 64 62 65 61 56 65 65
with vocational 6-10 75 74 79 79 74 73 81 78
degree 11-15 78 78 76 92 82 81 87 90
16-20 103 96 96 86 86 78 89 89
21-25 92 103 108 97 78 85 86 88
26-30 97 82 86 103 100 93 86 91
31-35 102 99 141 90 93 85 101 85
36-40 106 127 91 114 85 86 95 113
all 84 86 89 89 81 79 85 87
university 0-5 97 107 119 109 102 105 115 107
degree 6-10 114 127 135 124 140 132 135 141
11-15 141 140 190 150 143 144 151 147
16-20 135 157 172 153 152 157 149 164
21-25 132 162 173 166 165 163 155 153
26-30 138 149 167 175 162 189 151 173
31-35 159 151 158 166 172 165 177 166
36-40 134 191 147 149 185 151 175 212
all 126 144 164 150 150 151 147 151
Notes: Individuals included in the sample are between 15 and 60 years old, receive
non-zero income and work at least on September 30 of the respective year. Wages are
calculated in real Euro using the GDP de°ator (base year: 2000). Wages above the
social security ceiling are imputed.
46Table A4: The wage curve: GMM-estimation results¤
education lnwij;t¡1 lnuijt Wald- obs.
level short-run long-run Â2(3)-stat.
1980 - 2004
all 1 0.626 ¤¤¤ -0.028 ¤¤¤ -0.076 ¤¤¤ 143786 736
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
no vocational2 0.658 ¤¤¤ -0.030 ¤ -0.087 38 184
(0.228) (0.016) (0.073)
vocational3 0.775 ¤¤¤ -0.035 ¤¤¤ -0.155 ¤¤ 181 184
(0.082) (0.009) (0.070)
high school4 0.653 ¤¤¤ -0.044 ¤¤¤ -0.127 ¤ 60 184
(0.195) (0.007) (0.075)
university5 0.652 ¤¤¤ -0.028 ¤¤¤ -0.082 39 184
(0.196) (0.033) (0.066)
1984 - 1993
all 6 0.452 ¤¤¤ -0.041 ¤¤¤ -0.075 ¤¤¤ 21655 320
(0.006) (0.000) (0.001)
no vocational7 0.461 ¤¤¤ -0.043 ¤¤¤ -0.080 ¤¤¤ 524 80
(0.104) (0.006) (0.024)
vocational8 0.732 ¤¤¤ -0.043 ¤¤¤ -0.162 ¤¤¤ 363 80
(0.054) (0.007) (0.049)
high school9 -0.937 -0.055 ¤¤¤ 0.028 ¤¤ 127 80
(0.778) (0.006) (0.011)
university10 0.444 ¤¤¤ -0.032 ¤ -0.057 363 80
(0.034) (0.019) (0.037)
Notes: The dependent variable is lnwijt. ¤ Arellano-Bond (1992) two-step estima-
tion. 1 The Sargan-Â2(276)-test statistics rejects the H0 of no over-identi¯cation
with 31.8¤¤¤. The Arellano-Bond z-statistics rejects the H0 of AR(1) at -4.3¤¤¤,
and of AR(2) at 0.6. 2 Sargan-Â2(155)-test statistics: 6.4¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-
statistics: AR(1) -1.1, AR(2) 0.4. 3 Sargan-Â2(155)-test statistics: 6.7¤¤¤. Arellano-
Bond z-statistics: AR(1) -2.2¤¤, AR(2) -2.1¤¤. 4 Sargan-Â2(155)-test statistics: 6.3¤¤¤.
Arellano-Bond z-statistics: AR(1) -2.0¤¤, AR(2) -0.09. 5 Sargan-Â2(155)-test statis-
tics: 7.7¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics: AR(1) -2.2¤¤, AR(2) 0.8. 6 Sargan-Â1(75)-test
statistics: 31.8¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics: AR(1) -3.0¤¤¤, AR(2) 0.1. 7 Sargan-
Â2(64)-test statistics: 7.6¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics: AR(1) -0.9, AR(2) -1.2. 8
Sargan-Â2(64)-test statistics: 7.6¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics: AR(1) -2.2¤¤, AR(2)
-2.1¤¤. 9 Sargan-Â2(65)-test statistics 2.0¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics: AR(1) 1.3,
AR(2) -0.4. 10 Sargan-Â2(65)-test statistics 7.7¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics AR(1)
-2.2¤¤, AR(2) 0.2. GMM two-step standard errors are biased.
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